By Reuven Paz

Introduction
In recent years, the term ‘Soft Power’ has been used in relation to the war of the minds within the global war against global [Jihadi] terrorism. Soft Power is the ability to achieve goals by attracting and persuading others to adopt them. It differs from ‘hard power’ -- the ability to use economic and primarily military steps and power to impose one’s will. The success of soft power heavily depends on the actor’s reputation within the international community, as well as the flow of information between actors. Thus, soft power is often associated with the rise of globalization and/or neo-liberal international relations theory. Popular culture and media is regularly identified as a source of soft power, as is the spread of a national language, or a particular set of normative structures; a nation with a large amount of soft power and the good will that engenders it inspire others to acculturate, avoiding the need for expensive hard power expenditures.[1]

The following is based on an analysis of 4,593 IP addresses (1,452 unique IP addresses). The IPs were acquired from 19 of the more prominent of the Salafist/Jihadist forums, including both Arabic and non-Arabic forums, from 01 January through 30 April of this year. For reasons of operational security we are not able to identify the specific sites sampled, except to note that the list of of sites will bear a striking resemblance to current or former "Top Sites" lists published at internet-haganah.org.

Excerpt from 'Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends'
By: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, G'lilot, Israel

(click here to download the complete report)

Chapter VI

Global Jihad in the Middle East in 2006

A. Overview

1. In 2006, global jihad in the Middle East was aimed against Western targets and against “infidel” Arab regimes rather than the State of Israel. Likewise, Israeli and Jewish institutions worldwide were not targeted by the global jihad in 2006.

2. The year 2006 saw the increase of the influences of global jihad ideology on the various terrorist organization operatives in the PA-administered territories. That was especially true for the Gaza Strip, which borders the Sinai Peninsula, a focal point of global jihad. The ideological influences on local operatives turned into local cells associating themselves with global jihad.

3. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that global jihad organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere may direct their activities against Israel: Israel (and the Jewish people) have already been targets for global jihad acts of terrorism, and in 2006 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s second-in-command, described Israel as “the scene of jihad” (i.e., an infidel country that is a legitimate target for attack).

4. Due to the potential threat posed to Israel by global jihad organizations in the Middle East, this study not only examines the activity of global jihad in the PA-administered territories but also presents an outline of its activity in the Arab countries bordering Israel. Anti-American (and anti-American ally) global jihad activities in Iraq are not dealt with.

By Reuven Paz

Introduction

On January 14, 2007, one of the leading Jihadi-Salafi scholars, the Kuwaiti Sheikh Hamed bin Abdallah al-Ali, published a new and interesting document on his website t titled “The Covenant of the Supreme Council of Jihad Groups (Mithaq al-Majles al-A`la li-Fasael al-Jihad).[1] The document was immediately circulated in Jihadi forums and as expected received enthusiastic support. The document is the first of its kind since Osama bin Laden and his colleagues issued the declaration of the founding of the World Islamist Front against the Crusaders and the Jews in February 1998. That declaration had symbolized the formation of the organizational framework that had in fact formed Al-Qaeda or Qa’idat al-Jihad as a front. Although, Al-Qaeda has emerged in several forms ever since, it is perhaps best understood as a front organization.

Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Fighel
ICT – Senior Researcher
September 29, 2006

Al-Qaeda could expand its activities into Lebanon exploiting the current conflict there. Such a move, already publicly urged by Al-Qaeda leaders, could not be ruled out despite the gap between the predominantly Sunni Muslim group and Lebanon's militant Shiite Hezbollah, which ended with a 34-day war with Israel last month. Al-Qaeda's ambition to expand in the region was stated in a letter from its deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahri to its then chief in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which was intercepted and released by the United States last year. Zawahiri talked about the priority attached to being successful in Iraq so it could then be used as a platform to extend their activities into the Levant, meaning Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

Qa`idat al-Jihad: Moving Forward or Backward? The Algerian GSPC Joins Al-Qaeda, by Reuven Paz

By Reuven Paz

Introduction
In October 31st 2005, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published in Jihadi web sites an interesting threatening analysis of Al-Qaeda’s strategy in planning its attacks and choosing the operatives that carries them out.

By Reuven Paz

Introduction
On September 25, 2005, a known Al-Qaeda supporter, nicknamed Abu Muhammad al-Hilali, published a unique analysis on the Internet, combining it with instructions for Jihadi terrorist activity in Egypt, mainly the Sinai Peninsula.[1] The analysis is based upon the two series of terrorist attacks at the Taba Hilton hotel and two resorts in Sinai in October 2004, and the attack at the Red Sea resort Sharm al-Sheikh in July 2005. The message has gained particular significance in light of the Israeli warnings of possible terrorist attacks against Israeli tourists in Sinai in recent days. The Sinai is a popular destination season for thousands of Israeli visitors, especially during the Jewish holiday season.

By Reuven Paz

Source: Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2
Edited by: Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown
Published by: Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World
Hudson Institute, September 2005

The lead-up to the war in Iraq put the issue of the potential acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups at the top of the list of Western priorities. More than two years after the American and British occupation of Iraq began, however, no evidence for the existence of such weapons on Iraqi soil has been found, nor is there is any real proof of operational cooperation between the Saddam regime and any Islamist terrorist groups in field of WMD. Moreover, there are also no real signs that Qa`idat al-Jihad or affiliated Islamist groups plan to use WMD in the near future.

In a confidential, January 2004 report written for the United Nations, a panel of experts led by Mr. Michael Chandler, concluded: “The al-Qaeda terror network is determined to use chemical and biological weapons and is restrained only by the technical difficulties of doing so.” The experts added, “The risk of al-Qaeda acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction also continues to grow… Undoubtedly al-Qaeda is still considering the use of chemical or bio-weapons to perpetrate its terrorist actions…” However, what al-Qaeda lacks still today “is the technical complexity to operate (WMD) properly and effectively.” “They want to (acquire and use WMD), but have difficulties in dealing with it.”

This paper is meant to review the threat of terrorist-acquisition and use of WMD from the point of view of the terrorists themselves. It focuses in particular on the perspective of Qa`idat al-Jihad and its affiliates, and on recent developments in the larger discussion of WMD within what should be broadly called the “culture of Global Jihad.”

By Reuven Paz

Suicide or martyrdom operations, most recently in Europe but most intensively in Israel and in growing numbers in Iraq, leave the western world astonished. The terrorist attacks in London and Sharm al-Sheikh in July 2005, like other attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliated Jihadi groups worldwide, raise the unsolved question, "what does al-Qaeda really want?" What is its ultimate goal, besides the apocalyptic views and wishful thinking of its younger supporters, who seek to see Islamic rule and law spread throughout the world, or at least across the huge Arab and Muslim world? And what is the real effect, weight, and role of the war in Iraq? To answer these questions it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the ideology and the strategy of al-Qaeda or Global Jihad.