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As with authority, there are characteristics of the group and of Ahmed's relationship to it that will affect his willingness to kill.

Group factors are presented by Grossman under the rubric of Group Absolution, which in my application of his model to jihadis on the Internet I have renamed Diffusion of Responsibility.[6]

Intensity of support for killing
As with authority, the group may express support for Ahmed in his mission to kill the infidels, but so long as that group continues to exist solely on the Internet such support will always have its limits. While Zawahiri is well known to government agencies, and thus has little to lose by publicly expressing his desire for Ahmed to kill, the same may not be the case for members of Ahmed's virtual group. Their expressions in this regard will by definition be made over telecommunications channels, channels that are undoubtedly under some degree of surveillance. This is doubly so if they express their support for killing in some more public venue, such as a jihadi forum, or in comments on a blog.

Legitimacy of the group
Groups of soldiers – the primary focus of Grossman's work – are constituted by legitimate government authorities, thus legitimacy is inherent in such groups. A jihadist group, regardless of whether it exists in cyberspace or not, has no such legitimacy. The group must justify its existence not once but perpetually, or risk its status diminishing - something which, were it to occur, might not only reduce Ahmed's willingness to kill, but also increase the willingness of Ahmed or other group members to leave the group or even turn against it.

Size of group
It is interesting to note how a process (diffusion of responsibility) that is commonly associated in the literature with inaction - for example, the failure of bystanders to intervene - can also be associated with the worst kind of action. Either way the diffusion affect creates a form of anonymity behind which men may hide. It seems logical that in this regard the larger the group, the more responsibility for any action undertaken by Ahmed is diffused among the other group members. Ahmed says "I only did it because my group was right there with me, supporting me all the way," and the other group members are free to say "I didn't actually kill anyone, it was Ahmed who did it."[7] Of course, in order to do any killing the distance between group members will have to be closed.

Proximity of the group
The group being a thing far away, existing in the clouds of cyberspace, it will have to either accept the limits on communication and action that such distance imposes, or the distance will have to be closed by members who dare to travel to meet with others. Such travel can involve a degree of risk under the best of circumstances, and the risk only increases with the distance that must be travelled and the number of borders – if any – which must be crossed. In the post-9/11 period we have seen a number of groups that formed wholly or partly online, and then progressed to face-to-face meetings in order to facilitate planning and execution of terrorist attacks.[8] Fortunately, a combination of online surveillance, border controls, and international cooperation prevented such efforts from bearing fruit.

Identification with group
While the Internet presents a challenge for the global jihad when it comes to issues of legitimacy and proximity, it is perhaps uniquely suited to facilitating the development and expression of group and individual identity. A thorough discussion of why that may be is beyond the scope of this essay, but it seems that issues related to computer-mediated communications and the feeling of presence that such an experience engenders has much to do with it.[9] Duration is likely to play a part in this as well.

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[5] Psalm 133

[6] Grossman notes that his group absolution is basically synonymous with diffusion of responsibility, and I prefer the latter as it ties into an existing body of social science research.

[7] I am trying very hard to avoid getting into a discussion of Granovetter's Strength of Weak Ties theory (1973, revisited in 1983) but for future consideration, group size and group strength are likely to be important and interdependent variables. Assessing group strength on the basis of the ties that bind group members is likely to be the most problematic issue, as it will depend on how one defines the core concept of strength. In accordance with the theory, weak ties have important strengths, and strong ties have certain weaknesses.

[8] The best documented of such cases include those of Aabid Khan and his associates, and the Irhabi007 network. See Anatomy of a Modern Homegrown Terror Cell: Aabid Khan et al., http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaaabidkhan0908.pdf

[9] See for example Nicovich, S.G., Boller, G.W., & Cornwell, T.B. (2006). Experienced Presence within Computer-Mediated Communications: Initial Explorations on the Effects of Gender with Respect to Empathy and Immersion. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 10(2).