The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Counterterrorism
by Richard W. Leeman, Greenwood Press, 1991 (excerpts)
The Reagan administration's counterterrorist rhetoric was characterized by dogmatism, double standards and disinformation. Each of these eroded and inhibited the international political consensus which the administration sought to foster and which some important scholarship suggests is essential for lessening terrorism. By definition, a democratic rhetoric would have avoided these problems, and thus strengthened the United States' credibility and counterterrorist policy.
Dogmatic discourse oversimplifies complex topics, reducing them to broad assertions using condensational symbols. The problem with such discourse is that it hinders understanding on the part of the body politic. In the case of terrorism, Walter Laqueur pointed out broadly that the "indiscriminate use of the language has led to loose thought on the subject." 145 Others have concurred, directly linking the "loose talk" to the use of bipolar discourse. Adam Roberts, for example, condemned the propensity to classify organizations as either terrorist or not terrorist, noting that "reality is often messier." This kind of either-or thinking, he warned, "may actually inhibit understanding and lead to ill-conceived policies." 146 The use of naming to vilify opponents and reinforce the bipolar view similarly leads to a miscompre- hension of the problem. Conor Cruise O'Brien, former prime minister of Ireland, wrote that stereotyping the terrorist as "some kind of nut," or "thug," or "goon," "serve[s] mainly to confuse the debate on the subject." 147 Paul Wilkinson argued specifically that the Reagan administration's campaign to document terrorism as a Communist-inspired "network" did increase public concern, but also "had the effect of vastly oversimplifying the debate." 148 Similarly, Laqueur warned that the cancer metaphor was misleading when applied to terrorism. 149
The problems resulting from this simplification were not simply philosophical, however, for it affected how the body politic thought and talked about terrorism and its solutions. Specifically, oversimplification obscured more important problems, and subverted the development of an international political consensus.
Simplifying the debate, and using dogmatic exhortation, meant that the administration exaggerated the magnitude of the terrorist threat and the "action" necessary to counter that threat. Contrary to the claims of the Reagan administration, international terrorism was neither new nor unprecedented. 150 It was also, in and of itself, not a severe physical threat to American or international security. 151 Yet, because the administration characterized terrorism as so large a problem, the solution required was of similarly large proportions. Specifically, the zero sum game assumed that America needed to totally win -- "or else."
Such exaggeration distracted public attention from other, more pressing foreign policy problems. In a 1987 Roper poll a majority of Americans indicated that terrorism was the number one foreign policy problem faced by the United States. Yet Laqueur, writing about the same time, was persuasive as he emphatically disagreed.
Compared with the truly important problems of our time (the potential dangers of modern technologies, global debt, hunger in the Third World, overpopulation, certain new and incurable diseases -- terrorism [is], after all, a sideshow. 152
Exaggerating the physical threat of terrorism itself also obscured the major threat of terrorism, for example, to the democratic functioning of the system. According to scholars like Paul Wilkinson and Walter Laqueur, the greater threat of terrorism is that a conflict begun by terrorism might escalate, both internally and externally. An internal escalation would threaten civil liberties, while an external escalation could lead to war between established states. 153 In both instances, the threat is from the response to terrorism, not from terrorism itself. A bipolar world view avoids that realization, however, focusing instead entirely upon the terrorist's evil.
Dogmatically asserting the zero sum nature of the conflict also inhibited the full development of an international political consensus against terrorism. First, it is important to note that much scholarship suggests that terrorism is best treated by defining acts as criminal, rather than trying to define the more ambiguous term "terrorism" as illegal. 154 By narrowly defining what is illegal, terrorists can be prosecuted for specific, illegitimate actions. That is, international terrorism, as all international crime, should be approached in the same manner as ordinary crime, only on a multinational basis. Indeed, according to Christopher Hewitt's exhaustive study, putting terrorists in prison does reduce the incidence of terrorism. 155 In the case of international terrorism, the problem is to ensure that criminal statutes are enforced, and only a voluntary political consensus can, at this point in time, ensure that enforcement. In a very real sense, international law works in the same way that domestic law works -- via consensus. 156 Reagan's bipolar division of the world -- civilization versus the terrorist barbarian -- ignored the evolution of international law and the possibilities therein. Conceiving the conflict simply as one of "moral resolve" allowed few opportunities for consensus to be built. 157
Adam Roberts singled out the Tokyo Declaration as one case in point. The Tokyo economic summit advanced the claim that "terrorism has no justification." The problem, as Roberts saw it, was that the Declaration gave "no clue that the various attempted justifications of terrorism have been undertaken at all seriously." 158 Phrased another way, like so much of the Reagan administration's rhetoric, the Declaration exhibited a paucity of evidence and lack of good reasons to warrant the stated conclusion. As Roberts pointed out, evidence and reasons existed in sufficient number. The Declaration assumed a political consensus, rather than trying to build one.
This lack of [ ] consensus has hindered the enforcement of international law. Greece, for example, has refused to prosecute or extradite Mohammed Rashid. 159 Italy, of course, permitted the release of Abul Abbas. Significantly, in the most notable case where the Reagan administration prosecuted a terrorist, extreme care was taken to seize Fawaz Younis in international waters and never let him enter any other country's jurisdiction -- even an ally's. 160
Dogmatic, exhortative discourse, then, oversimplified the discussion of terrorism, raised unrealistic expectations, and subverted political consensus building. In each instance, a nonreflective strategy of democratic rhetoric would have avoided the problem. Greater use of evidence and referential symbols would have provided the body politic with a clearer conceptualization of the problem. Foreign policy in general and the goals of counterterrorism specifically could have been formulated more realistically. Greater attention to eliciting rather than exhorting cooperation would have built consensus, not tried to command it.
The double standards invited by a strictly bipolar world view also eroded rather than built political consensus. In 1980 the US took Iran to the World Court on charges of illegally holding embassy employees hostage in Tehran. The World Court found for the U.S., providing some significant leverage in the diplomatic negotiations for release of the hostages. 161 Yet in 1986 the World Court ruled against the U.S. in the case of mining a Nicaraguan harbor. The US withdrew from the case, the Reagan administration denying that the Court had authority in the matter. The double standard thus applied was apparent. 162 O'Brien put the matter directly.
[For America to] provide clear and consistent political and moral leadership [would] require the United States ... to accept, without the present reservations, the authority of the World Court. I believe that a President of the United States who had taken these steps would be in a far stronger position than is now the case to give the world a lead in combined action against terrorism and to prepare the way for eventual superpower consensus on this matter. 163
A second example from Reagan's term was the bombing of Libya. Serious questions remain as to whether the action was justified under international law, as the administration claimed. Self-defense, as enumerated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, has typically been interpreted as an immediate response to attack, not a retaliatory, punitive action as was the air strike on Libya. 164 Again, this was not simply a theoretical linguistic exercise. International law consists of words, and for those words to have effect a political consensus must be built around a single interpretation of them. Five weeks after the U.S. bombed Libya, South Africa flew a series of punitive strikes against Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Echoing Reagan's justification, they claimed they had attacked "terrorist centers," which was clearly not the case in these instances. The double standards the Reagan administration employed in international law thus encouraged -- rather than discouraged -- additional terrorism. 165
The Reagan administration's disinformation campaign was yet a third example of the kind of policy invited by a reflective rhetoric. In the summer of 1986 the administration let leak exaggerated reports of Libyan plans for coming terrorist activity. The second half of the campaign was to put out the word that the United States was "planning" sizeable military retaliation. The purpose of all this was to frighten Qadhafi and unsettle his hold on the government of Libya. 166 The relationship of the campaign to the counterterrorist rhetoric of the administration was made clear in Secretary Shultz's subsequent justification. Using World War II as an analogy to their counterterrorist effort, he paraphrased Winston Churchill. "In time of war, the truth is so precious, it must be attended by a bodyguard of lies." 167
Clearly, however, the disinformation campaign damaged the administration's efforts to build consensus. Rather universally, international allies condemned the campaign and suggested that U.S. credibility had been significantly compromised. The Economist's reaction was typical.
If the [Reagan] administration wants to be believed when it really has something important to say about Colonel Qadhafi, it would do well, before it is too late, to remember Matilda For every time she shouted "Libya!" they only answered "Little fibber!" 168
The Economist analogized the incident to the Cuban Missile crisis. Adlai Stevenson, they argued, had so much trouble convincing the United Nations that Soviet missiles were in Cuba because two years earlier he had stood in the same forum and blithely denied U.S. involvement in the Bay of Pigs. Disinformation is a costly policy if consensus is a desired goal. Again, a nonreflective strategy of terrorism, stressing intellectual honesty, would have avoided this problem the administration's rhetoric incurred.
Thus, the Reagan administration's rhetoric of counterterrorism employed dogmatism, double standards, and disinformation. In each instance, political consensus was damaged. At the primary purpose of American counterterrorism at the international level is the preservation of consensual relations between nations, for example, the international rule of law. In all three cases, a non-reflective strategy would have avoided the problem by doing the opposite, and thus worked to build, not subvert, political consensus.
Indeed, the possibilities apparent in such an approach are suggested by Abu Iyad's recent article "Lowering the Sword." Compared with his 1981 autobiography, Iyad's shift in language is as sharp as George Shultz's discussed above. Iyad avoids invective, analyzes points with caution and care, allows for disagreement, and propounds compromise. For example, he not only avoids condemning Israel and America in categorical terms, but specifies some of those with whom he sees agreement; for example, Abba Eban, Ezra Weizman, and Yehoshafat Harkabi. 169 Iyad's consuming attention with the US.-PLO dialogue, as well as the article's timing, suggests that the change in tone owes much to the simple fact of the dialogue and the change in American strategy.
In effect, however, until late in its second term, the administration's reflective strategy of counterterrorism missed these opportunities, rejecting the advice offered by Senator Daniel Moynihan. "If we are to have any success, we must be seen to be acting in support of law. That is a standard to which neutral nations can repair. We have nothing to fear from it." 170
Presenting a Consistent Position
While a reflective strategy of counterterrorism explicitly subverts political consensus by weakening credibility, it also fails to work positively towards building political consensus. To do the latter requires a consistent position which also presents a framework within which to build agreement. Avoiding those rhetorical tensions present in the rhetoric of terrorism would be one productive means for providing that consistency.
While praising democratic government and "the people," the Reagan administration demanded agreement, thus sending mixed signals about democracy to the body politic. Explicitly, democracy was praised, but implicitly, the discourse condemned it by rejecting its attendant terminology.
The administration's treatment of evidence is a case in point. Democracy imparts a high value on informed deliberation, which in turn imposes evidentiary requirements on the person advancing a claim. The Reagan administration acknowledged this requirement, even citing it as an indicator of the difference between "us" and "them."
To retaliate, ... you've got to be able to get some evidence as to where are the bases from whence come these terrorists that you could strike at ... you've got to recognize that you don't want to just carelessly go out and maybe kill innocent people. Then you're as bad as the terrorists. 171
As noted above, however, the administration's counter- terrorist discourse generally indicated little concern for documentation. Instead, truth was asserted and obedience exhorted, with the administration imposing a lesser standard of evidence upon itself.
It's one of those things you can know ... but you can't really -- you couldn't go into court and prove that actually they were responsible for it, anymore than you contrive a couple of other governments that we feel are apparently supporting terrorist movements. 172
The administration thus placed itself in charge of indicting, trying, judging and punishing violations of international law.
The contradictory position of elitism versus populism damaged the effort to build political consensus. By attempting to assert truth, the administration simply echoed the terrorist. Thus, for example, the honored morality of counterterrorism, as constructed through exhortative discourse, looked much like the immorality of the terrorists condemned by the same speaker. In January of 1986 Reagan indicted terrorists for being fanatical, because they believed they earned eternity by becoming martyrs. "In other words, finding some poor souls that are fanatic enough that they can be told that they got a free ride to heaven if they'll go out and give up their own lives to kill someone else, innocent people." 173 The grounds of his condemnation were, however, little different than those contained in the following eulogy, delivered seven months earlier in honor of four marines who died in a Salvadoran bombing attack.
They were four young men who chose to follow an honored and ancestral path. And so they swung the bag over their shoulders, kissed their parents goodbye, and went off to serve their country... No words can console, but we know of the promise in the Bible, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." ... And [now] we receive them in death as they were on the last night of their lives, together and following a radiant light -- following it toward heaven, toward home. And if we reach or when we reach heaven's scenes, we truly will find it guarded by United States marines. 174
The paradox, and the problem, was that Reagan condemned terrorists for asserting a divinely inspired morality, but then similarly asserted the same position on his own behalf. Those in the audience who already agreed with Reagan's position would certainly find his assertion credible. However, consensus is not built by reaffirming the believer's commitment, it is fashioned by persuading the neutral or unconvinced. For those auditors, Reagan's contradictory positions between deliberated persuasion, in which the body politic acts in a decision-making capacity, and exhorted belief, in which Truth is a function of elitist assertion, would strike a discordant note. Rather than exploit the terrorist's rhetorical tension, his administration's discourse simply repeated it. Rather than provide a consistent position upon which consensus could be constructed, the administration presented contradictory appeals.
Communication versus Action
The second rhetorical tension was between communication and action. The emphasis on action was documented above. The administration perceived a need to move "beyond words and rhetoric" to answer terrorism with "action." It emphasized those things which "do" over those which "say" the aborted attacks, the "steps" to be taken such as armed sky marshal programs or intelligence sharing. Implicitly, however, [Reagan] recognized that "steps" are often communicative in nature for example, travel advisories, policy review committees, or political persuasion by Reagan himself. 175 Certainly the quantity of speeches given implied some value attributed to communication in the cause of counterterrorism.
Two specific costs were incurred by denying a critical role for communication in counterterrorism. First, there was a sense in which the reflective counterterrorist did not even apprehend the communication which surrounded the event. For example, Reagan frequently responded to Qadhafi through the media quoting the Colonel, rebutting him, responding to his responses, concerned about what Qadhafi's reactions would be.
[Qadhafi] said recently that Libya was -- and I quote -- "capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America. We are also capable of physical liquidation and destruction and arson inside America." 176
I wouldn't believe a word he [Qadhafi] says if I were you. 177
We have the evidence and he knows it. 178
I'm not gong to talk beyond the action we've taken here. I am not going to make any comment as to whether we have other actions in mind or what might be done. I think that Mr. Qadhafi would be very happy if I did answer such a question, but I'm not interested in making him happy. 179
Yet so strongly did Reagan disown communication with terrorists, he denied that a dialogue existed.
Q. ... Can you comment on the concern of some people that your dialog with Colonel Qadhafi has resulted largely in enhancing his stature in the world?
The President Well, I haven't had any dialog with Mr. Qadhafi. 180
The second problem is that the speaker realizes that communication is influential, but this force must be subordinated to the superior term "action." This is the kind of perspective which often gives rise to the disinformation and double standards discussed above. One clear instance of this tension at work concerned the definition of terrorism. The cliche "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" was repeatedly attacked.
That's a catchy phrase, but also misleading. Freedom fighters do not need to terrorize a population into submission. Freedom fighters target the military forces and the organized instruments of repression keeping dictatorial regimes in power. Freedom fighters struggle to liberate their citizens from oppression and to establish a form of government that reflects the will of the people. 181
The use of this definition was emblematic of the rhetorical tension surrounding "communication." The definition itself was reasonable, although the third part regarding self-determination has proven problematic since a least the Treaty of Versailles. The application of the definition, however, was at several times capricious. Why, for example, was the CIA's assassination manual not terroristic? The manual clearly targeted civilian leaders, and not military forces. Why was the truck bombing of the Marine barracks an act of terrorism? Were not the Marines "military forces" sent in support of a government? In what way did that act not fit the definition of "freedom fighter"? Why was South Africa not condemned as terroristic? More than once the Reagan administration was caught in this rhetorical contradiction, such that by their own use of discourse one man's terrorist did indeed appear to be another man's freedom fighter. Like the problem of double standards above, this contradiction could only retard the development of political consensus.
As with the contradiction of elitism versus populism, this attitude towards communication could have been resolved through an attitude that perceived discussion as an integral facet of democracy. Rhetoric would not be a tool by which to use the body politic, it would be a method of communicating whereby the speaker assisted the audience in its decisionmaking capacty. Such an attitude would allow the speaker to apprehend the dialogue of terrorist and counterterrorist, and to use language in a consistent, consensus-building manner. It would allow the counterterrorist to exploit, rather than repeat, the terrorist's rhetorical tensions.
The continuing message throughout this analysis is that communication does matter, and what we say is important. Paul Wilkinson points out that the challenge of terrorism is for the liberal democracy to remain "true to itself." 182
To "remain true to itself" a democracy would remain true to its rhetorical fundamentals. It would focus on deliberation, openly and carefully constructing arguments for or against specific policies. It would de-emphasize dualistic thinking, hyperbole and bald dogmatism, concentrating instead on respecting the other and intellectual honesty. It would combine these with an ethic which considered the body politic as the ultimate arbiter of public policy. Mutual consent, not forced unanimity, would be the goal.
Building a political consensus is not just an act of idealistic consistency, however. It would likely lessen the incidence of terrorism, as the last section suggests. The French failed in Algeria, Wilkinson argues, because "they had nothing to offer the civilian population." 183 As Patrick Clawson notes, however, "law enforcement can be effective in a democracy only when it enjoys broad support from the general public, whose cooperation is needed to provide information and support law enforcement efforts." 184 International law enforcement requires the same. For that reason, Lawrence Freedman warns that Western counter- terrorists should avoid alienating the "possible support population." To avoid that occurence, however, means that "discrimination and political sensitivity are ... prerequisites." 185
Discrimination and political sensitivity do not fit well with a reflective counterterrorist strategy, however, as the example of the Reagan administration amply demonstrates. A bipolar view breaks the world into black and white, it does not discriminate the gray areas of support upon which consensus may be built. Creating an aura of fear by building a portrait of a cancerous terrorist network feeds this exhortation, but it does not help construct a discriminating or politically sensitive body politic. Using double standards, specious legal arguments, and disinformation does not demonstrate political sensitivity towards the international body politic. It erodes the communication vital to democracy, it does not build it.
Paul Wilkinson wrote tellingly that "terrorism, like war, is the enemy of the politics of compromise, bargaining, trust and relative peace." 186 The same could be written for the reflective strategy of counterterrorist rhetoric. If such a strategy is ineffective, however, a question remains whether compromise is possible between strategies. That is, would a mixture of reflective and non-reflective strategies be an appropriate alternative? I turn next to the case of the Nixon Administration.
[***] Agnew's Reflective Rhetoric
Vice President Spiro Agnew drew on the reflective tendencies in Nixon's rhetoric and amplified them, using almost none of the non-reflective elements to mitigate his bipolar discourse. Agnew argued that the United States was divided between those who adhered to American values and those who did not. Like the Weathermen's, his division was a sharp one, legitimizing certain attitudes and actions because of those they opposed.
America cannot afford to write off a whole generation for the decadent thinking of a few ... We can, however, afford to separate them from our society -- with no more regret than we should feel over discarding rotten apples from a barrel. 82
In traditional bipolar fashion, Agnew argued that America was at a moral crossroad. Only two paths were available. Choosing one path would call "for all good men to fight for the soul of their country." Choosing the other was disreputable, filled with moral peril. "If we are lazy and foolish, this nation could forfeit its integrity, never to be free again." 83 Echoing the Weathermen's goal of polarizing the country, Agnew argued that polarization was desirable "if, in challenging, we polarize the American people, I say it is time for a positive polarization." 84
While Agnew talked of "positive" polarization, however, his dualistic world was constructed primarily by invective. Those who led the protests were the "merchants of hate," given to "storm-trooper tactics" in order to "impose absolutism or create anarchy." 85 They were "irresponsible," "reckless," with "dictatorial" demands. 86 Just as the Weathermen's "system" was populated with imperialist pigs who "corroded" Americans' "minds," Agnew's "they" included the "radical faculty [who were] poisoning the student mind." 87
Significantly, like Nixon, Agnew began his definition of "they" with those who used violence and then expanded the definition to include those who simply protested. He did not, however, begin with the functional definitions Nixon used. Agnew instead started with a single summarizing term "campus radicals." 88 Like Nixon, however, Agnew began with those who were definitionally antidemocratic -- for example, "anarchists" and the "violent" -- but then expanded his term to include "hard-core dissidents." 89 Whereas violence was originally the defining characteristic for distinguishing "us" versus "them," now the voicing of unpopular opinions differentiated the two. This division resembled the Weathermen's, in which "they" were first defined as the "imperialist pigs" who created "the system," but then expanded to include those who showed "a little politeness" to the system.
Surrounding the term "campus radicals" Agnew layered invective which suggested a less-than-human status for his opponents, asserting his own "civility" in direct contrast to their "barbarity." For example, "they" were less-than-human because they wanted "irrational power" and engaged in "irrational protest." The Vietnam Moratorium was "idiotic." 90 Their less-than-human status made them akin to "vultures." 91 Sexual terms, too, were used to degrade opponents to brutish status. Protest leaders "pervert honest concern to something sick and rancid." 92 Agnew's invective echoed the Weathermen's metaphors of insanity, bestiality and sexual perversion. Just as for the Weathermen, those labelled less-than-human could be easily dismissed rhetorically. America, said Agnew, should "sweep that kind of garbage out of our society." 93
Because the world was bipolarly divided into the moral "us" versus the immoral "them," no middle ground was permissible. As the Weathermen argued that "there are no neutrals," so, too, Agnew's "they" included those who might try to remain in the middle. Not only were protestors grouped with bombers, politicians who temporized were "parasites of passion" and "ideological eunuchs" who "ooze sympathy" for the "merchants of hate." 94
As with most bipolar constructions, compromise was impossible because one side was moral and the other was not. Compromise was dangerous because of the enemy's insidious nature. "Evil cloaked in emotional causes is well disguised and often undiscovered until it is too late. " 95 The conspiratorial forces at work were powerful "If the people who can do something don't start acting -- I tremble at the thought of what forces could fill this vacuum." 96
The bipolar division of legitimate and illegitimate also implied a dogmatic control of the truth, which required the speaker simply to exhort audience approval of action, not to deliberate upon which course of action to take. For Agnew, like the Weathermen, the veracity of his claims was absolute -- the "facts" were patently obvious "the facts prove" and "this is a fact." 97 The question, therefore, was one of moral fortitude, not policy. "Any leader who does not caution this nation on the danger of this direction lacks moral strength." 98
Agnew considered it his moral obligation to "speak out" because "how can you ask the man in the street in this country to stand up for what he believes if his own elected leaders weasel and cringe?" 99 Just as Bernardine Dohrn complained that the Weathermen had been "wimpy on armed struggle," so Agnew disparaged any moderation toward me student demonstrators. Masculinity would be threatened by "giving in." "We are an effete society if we let it happen here." 100 Ill-defined was what "it" was that could not be allowed to happen.
Agnew's discourse revealed clearly the two rhetorical tensions displayed by the Weathermen elitism versus populism and communication versus action. On the one hand, he held up for admiration the democratic process grounded in "the people" for example, "the rules" of democracy, and America's "pluralistic society." 101 But he also denigrated that minority who exercised their pluralistic right.
Small bands of students are allowed to shut down great universities. Small groups of dissidents are allowed to shout down political candidates. Small cadres of professional protestors are allowed to jeopardize the peace efforts of the President of the United States. 102
The rhetorical move in this passage was representative of Spiro Agnew's discourse. The first sentence condemned a group as illegitimate for two distinct reasons. They coerced others outside the rule of law, for example, they shut down universities, and they were in the minority. Two fundamental tenets of democracy were violated by these students. If they shut down the university not by calling a boycott but by physical take-over, or threatened violence, then their action was terrorism, as defined in Chapter One. The second group, however, was hardly terroristic, although they shared certain characteristics. They were not interested in dialogue, they were small in number, and they violated societal norms. However, while they violated fundamental democratic principles, values Agnew implicitly supported, they were not terrorists. The last group cited were those simply exercising the right of protest within a pluralistic, democratic society. They too, however, received Agnew's condemnation. Until this third sentence, popular support, for example, the process of deliberation, was meaningful for Agnew. Implicitly the "small bands" were in contrast to the "silent majority." In this last clause of the definition, however, people's opinions must yield to the superior knowledge of the elites. Agnew hid the rhetorical move through the repetition of "small" and through the labels "cadres" and "professional," as if those qualities rendered one's opinion automatically illegitimate. Like Nixon, Agnew shifted his definitional standards in the middle of his discourse.
What Agnew created, in this passage and others, was a discourse favoring elite rule and mass obedience, distrustful of deliberation and the body politic. As he constructed it, the leaders should be entrusted to lead. "Saying that the President should understand the people's view is no solution. It is time for the people to understand the views of the President they elected to lead them." 103 Agnew's character- ization of the body politic was in sharp opposition to the attitude mandated by an ethic which valued honest disagreement. It mirrored, however, the Weathermen's "brainwashed" masses who would not listen to reason. According to Agnew, "frightening forces have been set in motion as the public has become conditioned to precipitate action rather than quiet discussion." 104 Within this sentence, Agnew displayed the contradiction of elitism versus populism. "Quiet discussion" suggested a vital role for the body politic, but one they could not be trusted to fulfill.
Agnew's rhetoric also displayed a mistrust of communication, while himself communicating. Too much facility with discourse was suspicious one should beware the "glib, activist element." 105 Just as the Weathermen characterized their opponent's discourse as "pig sounds," Agnew described his opponent's as "carping" and "clamor and cacophony." 106
For both Agnew and the Weathermen, communication was not just distracting, but potentially dangerous. For the Weathermen, "politeness about imperialism" was evil. Similarly, those who admitted any merit in the protestors' arguments warranted Agnew's condemnation.
Radical liberals have politically consorted and cooed with militants and radicals in our society. For years they have sought to give respectability to lawless conduct by pointing to the unhappy lot or alleged lofty social objectives of lawbreakers. For years they assiduously sowed the seeds of disruptions.... [They who] once fawned upon militants and radicals, now suddenly take a hard line against the riotous conduct which their inflammatory rhetoric excused and indirectly invited. 107Dissent was dangerous, protesting against policy disloyal, equivocation a sign of moral turpitude. This suspicion of discourse surfaced clearly in Agnew's discourse.
Agnew's rhetoric was, therefore, an extension of the reflective elements found in Nixon's own speeches. Both speakers began with a limited definition of illegitimate protest -- for example, terrorism -- but expanded it to include all of those who opposed their policy. Where Nixon minimized his use of bipolar constructions, invective, and hyperbole, however, Agnew's discourse knew no restraint. Agnew's rhetoric thus accentuated the reflective elements of Nixon's, giving them importance beyond what they might ordinarily have had.
Excerpts from The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, by Richard W. Leeman, Grenwood Press, 1991, pp. 139-149, 172-176.
Footnotes:
145. Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston Little, Brown, 1987) 299.
146. Adam Roberts, "Terrorism and International Order," Terrorism and International Ordered. Lawrence Freedman, et A. (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986) 9.
147. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Thinking About Terrorism," Atlantic Monthly June 1986 63.
148. Paul Wilkinson, "Trends in International Terrorism and the American Response," Freedman 51.
149. Laqueur 6.
150. Laqueur 301.
151. Christopher Hill, "The Political Dillemmas for Western Governments," in Freedman 98, 99. See also Laqueur 298.
152. Laqueur 298.
153. Laqueur 304, 32 1; and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York New York UP, 1979) 196.
151 Roberts 15.
155. Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-terrorist Policies (Lanham, Md. University Press of America, 1984) 86.
156. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State 41-47.
157. Stephen P. Cohen and Harriet C. Arnone, "Conflict Resolution as the Alternative to Terrorism," Journal of Social Issues 44 (1988) 175-189.
158. Robert 17.
159. Steven Engleberg, "Washington's War on Terrorism Captures Few Soldiers," New York Times 3 Mar. 1989 E3.
160. US. News and World Report 12 Sep. 1988.
161. Abraham A. Ribicoff, "Lesson and Conclusions," American Hostages in Iran The Conduct of a Crisis ed. Warren Christopher, et al. (New Haven, Ct. Yale UP, 1985) 374-395; Oscar Schachter, "International Law in the Hostage Crisis Implications for Future Cases," Christopher 325-345; and Harold Saunders, "Diplomacy and Pressure, November 1979 - May 1980," Christopher, 72-98.
162. Roberts 23-24; Wayne S. Smith, "Lies About Nicaragua," Foreign Policy Summer 1987 87-103.
163. O'Brien 66.
164. David Owen, "State Terrorism, Internationalism and Collective Action," Review of International Studies 13 (1987) 87.
161 Roberts 20.
166. New York Times 2 Oct. 1986 1; New York Times 3 Oct. 1986 1; New York Times 13 Oct. 1986 16.
167. New York Times 3 Oct. 1986 6.
168. "Facts and Whoppers," The Economist 11 Oct. 1986 20. Emphasis theirs. See also South China (Hong Kong) Morning Post 29 Aug. 1986, reported in the World Press Review Oct. 1986 9.
169. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), "Lowering the Sword," Foreign Policy Spring 1990, 91-112. It is especially interesting to compare this with his earlier commentary on Eban. Iyad 122.
170. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Terrorists, Totalitarians, and the Law," Terrorism How the West Can Win, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New York Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1986) 44.
171. Reagan, "Interview with editors and reporters of the Washington Times," Weekly Compilation 28 Nov. 1984 1850.
172. Ronald Reagan, "Interview with editors and reporters of the Washington Times" 1850.
173. Reagan, "The President's News Conference of January 7, 1986" 25.
174. Reagan, "Return of Slain United States Marines from El Salvador" 840.
175. See, for example, Reagan, "The President's News Conference of June 18, 1985" 806; and Oakley, "International Terrorism Current Trends and the U.S. Response" 4, 6.
176. Reagan, "American Bar Association" 878.
177. Ronald Reagan, "Exchange with Reporters on Reports on Libyan Assassination Squads," Public Papers 7 Dec. 1981 1144.
178. Reagan, "Exchange with Reporters on Reports on Libyan Assassination Squads" 1144.
179. Reagan, "The President's News Conference of January 7, 1986" 25.
180. Ronald Reagan, "News Conference," Public Papers 17 Dec. 1981 1164.
181. Reagan, "International Terrorism" 730. See also Bush, "Prelude to Retaliation Building a Governmental Consensus on Terrorism" 5-6; and Shultz, "Terrorism The Challenge to the Democracies" 2.
182. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State 123.
183. Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London Macmillan, 1974) 100.
184. Patrick Clawson, "Coping with Terrorism in the United States," Orbis 33 (1989) 355.
185. Lawrence Freedman, "Terrorism and Strategy," Freedman 69.
186. Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism 91.
82. Spiro T. Agnew, ,Impudence in the Streets," Frankly Speaking (Washington, D.C. Public Affairs, 1970) 48.
83. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 51.
84. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 46.
85. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 49; "Radicalism In Our Midst" 15, 17.
86. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 49; "Radicalism In Our Midst" 12.
87. U.S. News& World Report 24 Aug. 1970 34.
88. Agnew, "Masochism Versus the Facts" 26.
89. Agnew, "Striving Toward Workable Democracy" 59.
90. Agnew, "Radicalism In Our Midst" 12; "Impudence in the Streets" 45.
91. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 49.
92. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 49.
93. New York Times 31 Oct. 1970 12.
94. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 49-50.
95. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 45.
96. Agnew, Radicalism In Our Midst" 9-10.
97. Agnew; "Striving Toward Workable Democracy" 59; and "Impudence in the Streets" 49.
98. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 44.
99. Agnew, "The Power of the Press" 84.
100. Agnew, "Impudence in be Streets" 50. Emphasis his. See also Agnew, "Radicalism 4 Our Midst" 10.
101. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 46, 47; and "Agnew Talks About 'Those A" Speeches,'" U. S. News and World Report 24 Aug. 1970 34.
102. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 46.
103. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 48-49.
104. Agnew, "Dangers of the Media" 76.
105. Agnew, "Impudence in the Streets" 47.
106. Agnew, "Striving Toward Workable Democracy" 61; and "Agnew Talks about 'Those Agnew Speeches' " 34.
107. From Spiro T. Agnew, "Arizona Republican Reception," 22 Oct. 1970 3; as quoted in Andrew A. King and Floyd Douglas Anderson, "Nixon, Agnew, and the 'Silent Majority' A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Polarization," Western Speech Communication Journal 35 (1971) 252. Emphases mine.